Brazil, the largest coffee exporter, encouraged efforts in the 1960s to form the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), an organization of producing and consuming nations that restricted total coffee exports via a global quota. The quota led to significant rents in most producing countries, and to rent seeking. This paper analyzes the effects of rent seeking in Brazil during the ICA. The Brazilian Institute of Coffee (IBC), which was responsible for coffee policy, was the focus of rent seeking. I model the policy instruments used by the IBC and show how rent seeking affected the distribution of rents among competing actors over time. I also analyze how rent seeking ultimately led to reforms in the IBC during the late 1980s, and discusses lessons from the experience for controlling rent seeking elsewhere.
changes in domestic market structure and industry efficiency.
The second section reviews previous work on rent seeking and rent sharing. The third section presents a brief history of Brazilian coffee policy. The fourth section explains the ICA and presents a model of the Brazilian coffee sector that explains the size of the domestic quota rent. The fifth section shows how Brazilian policy instruments affected the distribution of the domestic rent among competing actors. The sixth section analyzes the effect of rent seeking on the IBC's use of coffee export tax rebates and its allocation of coffee quota among exporters. The seventh section analyzes institutional and policy reforms in the IBC during the late 1980s, and explains why these reforms ultimately led to abolition of the IBC and a nearly laissez faire coffee policy. The eighth section explains how the ICA quota caused a decrease in industry efficiency and how efficiency recovered after the quota was terminated. The final section contains conclusions and lessons.
2.0
Research on export quotas, rent seeking and rent sharing found that the ICA quota created a large quota rent in Indonesia, causing rent-seeking that (i) redistributed coffee income away from the Treasury and farmers toward bureaucrats, politicians, and exporters, and (ii) reduced coffee marketing efficiency and created waste. Individual exporters lobbied to obtain a larger quota allocation and tried to conceal the existence of the rents. Bureaucrats created even greater welfare losses via their efforts to elicit side-payments from exporters. These efforts forced exporters to market coffee rapidly, once an export quota was obtained, increasing uncertainty and reducing the price Indonesia received on world markets.
Bohman et al. estimated that Indonesia's total losses due to rent-seeking exceeded estimates of the potential gain that could have been achieved from the ICA.
McMahon (1989) found that Kenya imposed a ban on new coffee plantings following implementation of the ICA quota, increasing the incomes of existing producers and reducing production efficiency. Lopez and You (1993) found that the ICA quota increased the market power of a preexisting cartel of Haitian exporters. Temu (1991) found that coffee exporters in Papua New Guinea achieved policies that allowed them to capture most of the ICA domestic quota rents during the 1980s. Krishna and Tan (1992) and Krishna, et al. (1993) show that export quotas in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement led to rent sharing between Hong Kong exporters and US importers. Krishna and Tan found that the Hong Kong export price, inclusive of the cost of the export license and adjusted for transport costs and tariffs, was less than the U.S.
domestic price as a result of the buyer's market power in the product and license markets.
Historical efforts by Brazil to increase the international coffee price
In the early 1900s, coffee played a leading role in Brazil's economy and Brazilian exports accounted for 80% of the coffee traded internationally. The government accordingly manipulated the international market by accumulating coffee stocks in years of high production, with the intent to sell stocks in years of low production. Initial success with this policy (known as Valorizacao) persuaded policy makers that intervention would routinely succeed. In the years that followed, Brazil used export taxes, multiple exchange rates, support prices, stockpiling, the destruction of stocks, the eradication of coffee trees and other policy instruments to reduce exports and control domestic supply.
In 1953, Brazil created the Brazilian Institute of Coffee (IBC) to formulate and implement Brazilian coffee policy. The great power given to the IBC reflected coffee's importance and the widespread national view that manipulating coffee production and exports was key to its economic success. Various discretionary schemes were developed that caused inefficiency as well as scope for private gain, but these schemes were widely supported. By the time the ICA was negotiated, the Brazilian coffee policy focus had shifted from defending farmer incomes to maximizing foreign exchange earnings, achieving exchange rate stability, and increasing federal tax revenues to finance import substitution (Bacha, 1992) . The ICA was expected to facilitate these goals. 1
Brazil's ICA quota created a domestic rent
The ICA, which was renegotiated every six years, imposed a global quota on coffee exports to the member consuming nations, distributed in the form of individual quotas for exporting nations. Policing was undertaken by importing nations. A secondary, nonmember market existed because some coffee-importing countries elected not to join the ICA. The ICA allowed member exporters to sell to nonmember importers, but technically only at the same price that prevailed in the member market. In fact, large price discounts were offered on exports to the nonmember market whenever ICA quotas were in effect (Herrmann, 1986; Bohman and Jarvis, 1990) .
Quotas were first imposed in 1963, remaining until 1972, when the ICA lapsed due to disagreement among members. The ICA was renegotiated in 1976, but quotas
were not imposed because prices were high as a result of a severe Brazilian frost. Under the ICA, quotas could be imposed, varied, or lifted depending on the level of world coffee prices. In October 1980, quotas took effect again as prices fell, remaining in force until March 1986, when, due to rising world prices following a Brazilian drought, they 1 Centralizing coffee policy making within a largely autonomous institution like the IBC probably facilitated rent-seeking. Bacha (1992) and others argue that the lack of a democratic opposition during the were again lifted. Quotas were re-imposed in October 1987 , remaining until July 1989 Following imposition of a global ICA quota, the ICA assigned Brazil a share of the quota, denoted in Figure 1 as a fixed amount, q A , which it could sell on the member market at price P A . 3 The analytical framework used is developed in more detail in Bohman and Jarvis (1990) , , and . Brazil could sell additional coffee on the nonmember market at a much lower price, P N. I define the potential domestic unit quota rent as P A -P N , this being the unit rent created if Brazil followed policies to maximize economic surplus. 4 The potential total domestic quota rent was R = (P A -P N )q A . This rent could be captured by the government, allocated to other actors, or dissipated, depending on the policies chosen. 5
The total domestic quota rent averaged about $575 million annually from 1981 through 1988 (see Table 1 , column 9). The quota was terminated in June 1989; the estimated rent during the first six months of 1989 was $160 million.
Brazilian coffee policy

Overview of sector and institutions
Coffee was mainly produced by small and medium size farmers who sold their military government that ruled Brazil from 1964 to 1984 contributed to a climate that favored corruption. 2 Although a domestic quota rent existed in Brazil whenever ICA quotas were in effect, my research focused on the 1980s. The published information for this period is of higher quality and I was able to interview individuals who had participated in the coffee sector during this time. 3 How the ICA quota affected the international terms of trade is the focus of other studies, e.g., Akiyama and Varangis, 1990. 4 Brazil had market power in the member and the nonmember markets. To maximize economic surplus Brazil should have imposed optimal export taxes on coffee sold in each market (Bohman, 1991) . The definition of potential rents should include the total tax revenue achieved by these taxes. I assume that Brazil is a price taker in the nonmember market to simplify the estimation of coffee sector rents. 5 show how varying government preferences regarding distribution of the quota rent lead to different coffee policies once a domestic quota is introduced, with associated effects on economic welfare. Theoretically, an export quota should result in policies that cause a decline in the producer price of coffee in almost all cases, along with farmer welfare. Bohman and Jarvis show econometrically that producer prices did fall in most exporting countries when an ICA quota was in effect.
beans to private middlemen or to the IBC. The IBC established a Minimum Guaranteed Price (P MG ) at which it stood ready to purchase all coffee offered by farmers. However, the IBC bought mainly for storage. Farmers usually found it profitable to sell coffee to private exporters at P D , the open market price, which normally exceeded P MG.
Private exporters sold Brazilian coffee to consuming country importers.
Exporters bought beans from farmers or through wholesalers and sorted the beans by quality. Exporters sold low quality beans to instant coffee manufacturers or domestic roasters and sold high quality beans to foreign roasters, mainly in Europe and North
America. The role of multinational traders (e.g., Cargill) and coffee roasters (e.g., Nestle)
varied over time and is discussed in Section 8. A high degree of concentration existed among exporters. Farmer cooperatives sold to exporters and rarely exported directly.
The IBC regulated export prices through numerous policies, especially the export tax (known as the contribution quota) and the minimum export registration price (P MR ).
The government established P MR as the basis for determining the amount of foreign exchange that exporters had to deliver to the Central Bank. After 1985, P MR was also used as the basis for levying the ad valorem export tax. Throughout the period studied, Brazil's coffee producing states levied an additional coffee sales tax, t s , on all sales, domestic and foreign. The IBC also provided export tax rebates (Avisos de Garantia) to importers. The functions and effects of the export tax, the export tax rebates, and the minimum guarantee price are described in sections 5.2 and 6.1.
Framework to measure the value and distribution of quota rents
The IBC had responsibility for allocating quota to domestic exporters, giving it additional justification for market intervention and putting it at the center of rent-seeking activity. The IBC effectively decided the disposition of the quota rent insofar as it also set the export tax and export tax rebates. In practice, although the rent was partly captured by the government through the export tax, an important residual rent was captured by exporters to whom quota was allocated. Another part was shared with foreign importers via export tax rebates that transferred domestic quota rent to rebate recipients. The interaction among policy instruments is briefly set forth below.
Exporters with a quota allocation purchased coffee at P D , the producer price, measured inclusive of exporters' marketing and processing costs, and sold coffee on the member market at P A' . In Figure 1 , the demand curve for Brazilian coffee, D B , intersects q A , the amount of coffee exported to the member market, at P A , Brazil's counterfactual member market price in the absence of export tax rebates. P A was bid up to P A' as a result of the rebates, which reduced the net price of Brazilian coffee (Jarvis, 2003) . Thus, the observed unit quota rent (per bag sold) on member market sales was r g = P A' -P D .
The export tax must be subtracted from the observed unit quota rent to obtain the residual rent per bag obtained by exporters. The export tax, which was generally not levied on sales to the nonmember market, captured rent for the Treasury that the exporter otherwise would have received. In contrast, the sales tax was levied on all exports, thereby depressing the producer price below the nonmember market price, P N . Sales tax revenues were not part of the potential quota rent, as defined. Recipients of export quota earned the residual or net rent, r n , with r n = r g -t cq , where t cq is the per bag export tax.
The Federal Government, via the IBC, collected the export tax, but also paid export tax rebates (Avisos de garantia) to foreign importers from 1965 to 1988. The total annual value of export tax rebates, Α, is known. See Table 2 . I determine the average annual unit rebate paid per bag of coffee exported to the member market, α, by dividing Α by q A , where q A is the number of bags exported to the member market. The government's net export tax revenue per bag was t cq -α.
Foreign importers participated in the domestic quota rent as a result of the export tax rebates that the IBC provided. Importers did not gain the full amount of the rebate since the rebate made the purchase of Brazilian coffee more attractive and led importers to bid up the gross price of Brazilian coffee. Thus, if the unit rebate was α, foreign roasters enjoyed a net gain equal to α', where α' = α -(P A' -P A ). 6 The economic gain enjoyed by different actors from their participation in the domestic quota rent was their unit gain multiplied by quota exports:
The shares received by the different groups that competed for rents are shown in Table 3 . 7 Foreign importers captured the largest share of the quota rent, the IBC captured about 40 percent and domestic exporters captured the remainder. Farmers participated in the rent only if the producer price, P D , exceeded the non-member market price, P N .
Indonesia and Kenya implemented schemes to achieve this end Brazil did not. 8 If IBC officials received side payments linked to exporters' or roasters' gains, IBC officials participated in the rents. Such payments cannot be measured and, if they existed, are included in the estimated gains of exporters and foreign importers.
The aggregate gain of the participants, achieved by summing equations 1) through 3), equals the total potential rent, R:
The calculation for the total potential rent nets out the effect of any increase in the Brazilian price caused by the export rebates.
Estimates of the observed rent, the estimated potential rent, and its various components for 1981-89 are shown in Table 1 . Only the exporters and importers who agreed on each sale knew the actual price paid for exported coffee. The government thus could not report data on P A' . However, the minimum registration price, P MR , is known.
Traders in Brazil and New York believe that the government generally adjusted P MR to approximate P A' . 9 I used P MR -P D to estimate r g , an approach also adopted by Alimandro and Rabello de Castro (1983) . The resulting estimates of r g are consistent with the prices paid for quota during public auctions in 1988-89, as discussed later.
exports. This encouraged exporters to bid the domestic price above P N , resulting in excess production and trade relative to marginal prices and affecting the division of quota rents. In Brazil, farmers' cooperatives received a small amount of the rent after 1982, through quota allocations based on their working stocks, but insufficient to warrant special attention. In the calculation of the rent, data for the observed producer price is used for P D . Reliable data for P N is not available for Brazil and it is assumed equal to P D /(1-t s ). 9 Until June 1986, P MR was set administratively and often was not changed for significant periods, i.e., 19 months between January 1982 and July 1983. After June 1986, P MR was set using a published formula as a function of spot coffee prices in the New York and London markets. Exports continued whether the minimum registration price was higher or lower than the member price. When P A exceeded P MR , the exporter declared P MR to be the sales price and retained the difference abroad or repatriated it on the black market, earning an additional premium. When P MR exceeded P A , the exporter declared P MR to be the sales price, as required, and had to purchase additional foreign exchange on the black market in order to submit the required amount to the Central Bank. Theoretically, the setting of P MR acted similarly to an export tax or subsidy. Exporters in Brazil indicate that they used specific formula to determine the profitability of exports, taking into account the relationships between P A and P MR , the black market exchange rate, the
The distribution of rents over time
The ICA quota was in force during 1981-1985, though 1981 was atypical because the IBC emitted a very large number of export tax rebates in 1980 and in 1981, resulting in negative net tax revenue and a net export subsidy in both years. ICA quotas were temporarily removed in March 1986, and restored again in October 1987. 10 Theory suggests that domestic rents should have disappeared when the quota lapsed and the estimated rents are indeed small. In 1987, the IBC began to auction part of the export quota. The IBC also gradually changed the standard coffee contracts to reduce and then eliminate the export tax rebates. These policy changes eliminated the transfer of rents to foreign importers and allowed the IBC to capture a growing share of the quota rent. After the ICA quota ended in mid-1989, there was no quota rent. The export tax was reduced to 6 percent and producers' share of total coffee revenues rose from about 50% of coffee export revenue during the early 1980s to about 80% after 1990 (Tables 1 and 2 ).
Rent seeking and rent sharing with foreign roasters
This section describes the efforts of each major actor to capture a larger share of the rent during the early 1980s quota period, with brief reference to the historical context.
Export rebates and rent sharing with importers
Beginning in 1906, Brazil used an export tax and many other policies to restrict coffee exports and increase the world price. These policies resulted in the steady loss of Brazil's market share as competing countries increased production (Bacha, 1992) . By the 1960s, Brazil wanted an international agreement that would achieve a higher price and also preserve Brazil's market share. Brazil was thus a proponent of the ICA.
producer price, and other variables. 10 Theory suggests that domestic quota rents should have disappeared when the quota lapsed.
When the ICA was negotiated in 1963, Brazil accepted an export quota that was smaller than its then current exports. Because its quota was large, continued to restrict exports to achieve a higher member market price, believing that it had market power even within the member market. Brazil changed this policy in 1965, based on a theoretical framework developed by Delfim Netto (1959) and further elaborated by Delfim Netto and Pinto (1965) . Delfim Netto and Pinto argued that although world coffee demand was inelastic, the demand for Brazilian coffee was highly price elastic. This argument implied that Brazilian exports could be profitably increased, up to the quota limit, via a price discount. Further, since the coffee importing and roasting industry was highly concentrated, Brazil believed that it could "exert its capacity to discriminate among buyers according to their respective bargaining power" (Bacha, 1992) . The IBC secretly began to sign preferential contracts with a few large importers, providing them with a unit refund (per bag purchased). This refund, denoted an export tax rebate since it was paid from export tax revenues collected by the IBC, was provided in exchange for a commitment from the exporters to purchase a larger amount of coffee, spread evenly throughout the year. . When the price is P T , total member market exports equal q I 0 + q II 0 , which is assumed less than the Brazilian quota. Provision of a unit export tax rebate, α, to the largest importers is assumed to expand sales to these importers from q II 0 to q II 1 , sufficient to fill Brazil's quota. 11 If Brazil was to increase exports with less revenue loss than would have occurred had the price (the export tax) been reduced on all coffee exports, the (negotiated) demand of the largest importers had to be more price elastic than the demand of other importers. 12 , 13 Because trade in Brazil was undertaken by private exporters, the IBC had to develop a mechanism to ensure that a favored roaster who signed a long term contract could purchase coffee from any exporter and pay only the agreed discounted price, while also ensuring that the exporter received the actual market price. The mechanism adopted was a negotiable, U.S. dollar-denominated certificate called an Aviso de Garantia. This certificate (the export tax rebate) was issued by the IBC to a roaster on completion of a purchase and the certificate could be redeemed by the roaster on its next purchase, reducing the effective price of coffee. Jarvis (2003) calculates that use of the export tax rebates might initially have improved Brazilian welfare. Brazil was not filling its quota. The number of Avisos issued was relatively small from 1966 through 1969, averaging $21 million per year, and exports did expand by about 10 percent. 14 Jarvis concludes that Brazil's potential gain was about $42 million, which it apparently split fairly evenly with the large importers who received the rebates. Nonetheless, the amount paid out in rebates grew rapidly after 1969, averaging $86 million per year in 1970-72, even though there was no further 11 Since the export tax rebates were provided only to the largest importers, these contracts were referred to in Brazil as "special deals." 12 In the preferential contracts, Brazil tied the amount of the export tax rebate (and thus the net price of its coffee) to the price of its competitors, intending to make price-cutting by them uneconomic. It was argued that any price cut would immediately be followed by an offsetting higher export tax rebate from Brazil. 13 The theoretical justification for this policy has been widely accepted in Brazil for many years, e.g., "The secrecy and discriminatory character of such supply contracts became a point of hot contention, but their commercial logic from an oligopolist market point of view seems impeccable..." (Bacha, 1992) . 14 Rebates were initiated in late 1965; 1966 is the first whole year during which rebates were paid.
increase in exports. The rebates then averaged $260 million per year in 1973-79, even though there was no ICA quota during that period. Brazil lost from issuing such a large number of rebates. A reasonable conclusion is that rent seeking activity caused the amount of export tax rebates issued to increase sharply over time.
Indeed, widespread allegations of irregular practices caused the IBC to abandon the secret discriminatory contracts in 1979 (Bacha, 1992) . The government considered abandoning the Minimum Registration Price and other aspects of the government's coffee management policy, including export rebates, and moving toward a free market system. However, this recommendation was rejected "at the highest level of government" (Bacha, 1992) . The IBC instead initiated new "standard contracts" that allowed all importers to obtain export tax rebates. Again, the rebate was tied to the difference between the Minimum Registration Price and a weighted average of the international prices of Brazil's competitors (Other Milds and Robusta).
Since all exporters were given rebates, a new justification was needed for their use. Instead of using the rebates to achieve price discrimination, the IBC said that rebates were needed to offset distortions caused by other policy instruments. The IBC argued that it needed the Minimum Registration Price (P MRP ) as a basis for taxation and foreign exchange deliveries and said that producers sold at this price. However, it said, since the administratively determined P MRP was likely to be intermittently higher than the international price, export tax rebates were needed to ensure that private exporters could remain competitive at all times. 15 This argument was widely accepted, though it seems 15 The large amount of avisos issued each year suggests that the Minimum Registration Price exceeded the competitors reference price each year. My calculations suggest that the Minimum Registration Price was not, on average, much higher than the international price for Brazilian coffee. However, the contracts may have been skewed to provide a continual flow of rebates.
to have no theoretical or practical validity. The government had no control over the prices at which coffee was sold internationally and, as previously noted, did not even collect data on actual transactions. Private exporters did not sell at P MRP , but at whatever was the market-clearing price for Brazilian coffee. Exporters had to pay a somewhat higher export tax and/or purchase foreign exchange on the black market when P MRP exceeded the market price, and those considerations influenced the amount exporters paid producers. However, imposition of a Minimum Registration Price did not impede sales.
Thus, the export tax rebates were not essential to Brazil's competitiveness, even within the prevailing distorted policy context.
In 1979, Brazil introduced a new type of Aviso in an effort to increase its market share. Brazil was expecting a return to ICA quotas, which had been suspended since 1972, and was negotiating its ICA quota. New contracts were "introduced in a rush and with strong concessions to the big roasting houses, to guarantee that 1979 shipments would not be lower than Colombia's 11 million bags, as this [would have] strongly negatively affected Brazil's negotiating position at the ICO" (Bacha, 1992) . 16 One concession was a "Price-Fall-Guarantee" in the contracts, a cost-free hedge. The hedge promised importers a rebate equal to the difference between the purchase price and the lowest 10-day moving average FOB price occurring in the period between the date of purchase and the expected transit time from Brazil to the purchaser's homeport.
Unfortunately for Brazil, the international price began to decline sharply soon thereafter, causing the IBC to pay out US$1.3 billion and US$2.0 billion in export tax rebates in 1980 and 1981, respectively. These amounts significantly exceeded the export tax revenue collected. Thus, Brazil found itself implementing a net export subsidy on member market exports while they were constrained by an export quota. 17
The shift to standardized contracts ended the special deals, but provided export tax rebates to a wider set of importers and thereby facilitated rent seeking. Although it is rumored that rent seeking contributed to corruption of the most common form, export tax rebates had the more profound effect of transferring rents to foreign importers. In another paper, I econometrically estimate the gain to roasters from the emission of Avisos (Jarvis, 2003) . The results suggest that the emission of $1 in unit export tax rebates (per sack) increased the gross international price of Brazil's coffee by about $0.50. If so, the use of export tax rebates transferred about $0.50 to foreign importers for every $1 in rebates emitted. Most of the transfer occurred in the 1980s. 16 Brazil's exports totaled 12 million bags, with 3 million bags shipped in December. 17 The sales tax was imposed on all exports, but it had no incidence on member market importers. 18 Avisos were traded among coffee exporters on an informal New York market throughout the period, generally with only a small discount from their face value. 19 It is rumored that the aviso accounting system at one point showed a large discrepancy, with about $1.5 billion more Avisos having been redeemed than issued. Several respondents mentioned a Brazilian saying that "only two agencies in the world can issue US dollars, conclude that had policy making been informed and rational from a national viewpoint, the use of rebates would have remained small and/or ceased quickly.
I do not know all of the considerations that lay behind the initiation of export rebates. Possibly, they were only intended to allow price discrimination, as suggested by Delfim Netto. However, Bates (1997) suggests that the rebates were implemented specifically to share the benefits of the ICA global quota with the large international coffee roasters in at least tacit exchange for their political support within the United
States during the negotiation of the ICA. 21 My results are consistent with his hypothesis.
Nonetheless, the Brazilians with whom I spoke, including ex-government officials, systematically indicated that the government did not intend this effect and was unaware of any benefit to importers. It is possible that importers gained from rebates and determined, nor when the Avisos were redeemed. That so little information is available regarding the use of Avisos suggests the feasibility of administrative irregularities. 20 If the quota assisted importers to achieve an additional price differential between the Brazilian export price and the price in foreign countries -an aspect of the Krishna-Tan type of rent sharing --importers gained more. 21 It has often been asked why foreign importers supported the ICA quota agreement, which appeared to increase the price at which they purchased coffee. My results suggest that foreign importers, especially the few large importers who received all of the "special deals" during the early period, gained handsomely from the agreement.
supported the ICA partly on this basis, yet Brazil did not understand the effect.
Whatever the initial intent of the export tax rebates, rent seeking must have been the critical factor encouraging the continued and increase use of rebates over time.
Newly appointed IBC presidents frequently canceled existing long-term contracts and then signed new contracts (see Bacha, 1992 , for examples), a behavior consistent with rent-seeking activity. 22 The Price-Fall-Guarantee clause was apparently imposed in the Brazilian contracts in 1979 because Colombia had previously introduced this clause in its contracts (Manoel Correa do Lago, personal correspondence). This competition seems to have been a type of international rent seeking--the fight between Brazil, Colombia, and other countries for a larger share of the ICA quota. The drafting of the Price-FallGuarantee contracts may also have depended on bureaucratic blunder, the market power and astute negotiating of the foreign roasters, and domestic rent seeking.
The general faith in government intervention as a means of improving Brazilian economic welfare, and the complexity of Brazilian policies during this period, involving administrative prices and the simultaneous use of export taxes and rebates, doubtlessly increased the potential for rent-seeking. Bacha (1992) indicates that entrenched interests consistently opposed efforts to impose a simpler and more transparent set of policies.
Government revenues and their disposition
The IBC, as the government's representative, received only a small proportion of coffee export revenues during the early 1980s. Moreover, the revenues that it received seem to have been retained mainly for use by the IBC. In the late 1980s, the IBC sharply increased tax revenues, but these revenues were then reserved for use in the coffee sector so that again the coffee sector contributed little tax revenue for use by the federal government.
The IBC levied the export tax, which ranged from 5 to 37 percent during the 1980s quota regime. 23 As shown in In 1987, the IBC established a fund, FUNCAFE, to which all coffee tax revenue was pledged and which was to be used only for coffee sector development, including the support of coffee prices. In establishing FUNCAFE, the IBC hoped to persuade producers not to oppose efforts to generate additional IBC revenues, which were badly needed to support coffee prices (Dauster, personal communication) . In 1987, the IBC raised the export tax from 5 to 27 percent and, later, to 36 percent. Export tax rebates were eliminated and the IBC initiated auctions for coffee export quota. In response, the IBC's net revenues rose significantly. Nearly all of this revenue was used to purchase additional coffee stocks. 26 26 These stocks were still held by the government in the mid-1990s as there had been no agreement on what to do with the revenues that would be produced when the stocks are sold. 27 My initial estimates indicated that exporters suffered a loss (negative rent) in 1986, when there was a sharp spike in producer prices due to a drought. Negative rents are implausible since exporters buy coffee only so long as they can profit from the coffee purchased. Because inflation was extremely high at this time, 140% annually, exporters could have reduced the real price paid by lagging payment. I assume this is what they did and accordingly have set the rent to zero in 1986. 28 Changes made to the quota allocation formula, mainly in the stocks component, provided producers with an entry point that would have led to significant shares had the system been sustained for a long period. 29 Brazilian production expanded in the early 1980s when a quota was in effect. The government had either to purchase coffee for stocking, increase exports to the nonmember market, encourage exporters to hold additional stocks, or see the producer price decline sharply. One mechanism used to support producer prices involved tying part of the allocation of quota to the level of stocks held by exporters. The government required that exporters would have to store two extra bags of coffee for 90 days for every bag of coffee exported to the member market.
Exporters' residual rents
amounted to $174,200,000; the largest 10 exporters received 49 percent, or $8.5 million each on average. Approximately 150 registered exporters received a basic quota that was worth about $225,000 per exporter, or $33.8 million in total.
The high value of quota induced intense rent seeking. The effort by several producer cooperatives to obtain a share of the quotas is particularly interesting. Many coffee producers were members of a cooperative. Cooperatives generally did not export, acting mainly as collection points and processors, and were not allocated any quota. In 1981, producer cooperatives argued that they should be entitled to a quota allocation since they too held stocks --the stocks that they had collected from their members prior to sale to exporters. Exporters fought this effort, arguing that cooperatives had not increased their stocks --which was the basis for linking quota allocation to stockholding.
As part of their lobbying effort, the producers' cooperative commissioned the study by Alimandro and Rabello de Castro (1983) . 30 This study, though never published, circulated widely. It argued, as noted above, that exporters were benefiting from receipt of quota and argued that producers ought to share in this benefit. The IBC granted some concessions to cooperatives in 1982, a move that outraged exporters, but the IBC rejected proposals for more far-reaching changes. 31 Exporters continued to receive substantial residual rents through 1987, since 30 Bohman and Jarvis (1996) have shown that ICA quotas systematically reduced producer prices, effectively acting as a production as well as consumption tax). Producers did not generally appreciate this effect and did not oppose imposition of an export quota. Producers, or at least their organized leaders, who were aware that ICA quotas had resulted in quota rents that were being captured primarily by exporters, instead tried politically to gain a share of these rents. 31 For example, the IBC rejected a proposal from coffee producers to replace the system that allocated quota to individual exporters according to their past exports and other criteria by an auction. The IBC stated that an auction would not allow exporters to obtain precommitments from importers for the entire year, though it is not clear why this should be so. On several other occasions Brazil debated a move toward a more flexible, market-based system of coffee marketing, but each time it opted for a continuation of managed rather than free competition (Bacha, 1992 
Rent seeking by IBC bureaucrats
Many of my informants suggested that exporters who had access to inside information about policy changes earned income additional to the substantial residual rents described. For example, IBC officials allegedly leaked information to certain individuals or firms regarding planned IBC actions such as adjustments to the minimum registration price, the minimum guarantee price, and the suspension or commencement of export permits. Each of these policy actions affected prices in Brazil and/or New York, so that prior receipt of such information could be used for personal gain. As a result of the IBC's market manipulation, the "B" futures contract for Brazilian coffee on the New York market was de-listed.
Reform in the IBC
Following on more than two decades of inefficient management, including resistance toward greater reliance on market mechanisms, the IBC underwent dramatic reforms beginning in 1987. The reasons for the reforms, their immediate effect on the 32 I am grateful to Regis Alimandro for helping me locate data for nearly all of the auctions in that occurred in 1988 and 1989 . No data could be found for the auctions that occurred in October-December 1987. The IBC's records are largely inaccessible. When the IBC was terminated, its records were boxed and stored in warehouses. Some reportedly have been lost or burned. 33 Auction prices rose as export taxes were reduced. Prices were consistently higher than expected. Since exporters hoped for a return to administrative allocation of the quota, they may have paid higher prices than coffee sector, and their ultimate effect on the existence of the IBC provide insight on the process of policy reform in the presence of large rents.
In early 1986, the president of the IBC proposed Operacao Patricia, a secret effort sponsored by the IBC under which 18 Brazilian export firms attempted to purchase 1.5 million bags of Robusta coffee on the London market to prop up world prices.
Colombia sponsored a similar operation for Arabica coffee in the New York market. The
Brazilian operation was insufficiently capitalized, purchased less than half the amount anticipated and, when it failed, prices tumbled (Bacha, 1992) . The IBC lost heavily. The export houses involved then also claimed large losses (Castelo Branco, 1988; FEBEC, 1989 ) and asked for IBC reimbursement.
Operacao Patricia is a complex issue illustrating many aspects of the relationship between the IBC and Brazilian exporters. Some of the chosen exporters may have played the market simultaneously with the purchases made on behalf of the IBC in the belief that, since they were intent on raising world prices with funds guaranteed by the IBC, their own purchases would be indirectly guaranteed as well. It is not clear whether exporters made money on their own account even though they lost money on the IBC account, or vice-versa. Regardless, IBC sponsorship of a clandestine operation and the lack of strict accounting and supervision indicate large scope for irregular activities.
In the aftermath of the Operacao Patricia losses and the scandal that followed, Jorio Dauster was appointed President of the IBC. A diplomat, Dauster previously had been Brazil's chief negotiator for the ICA. He was widely respected, at home and abroad.
Exporters as well as producers supported his appointment. He took office in January 1987, while ICA quotas were still suspended.
current residual rents would justify, calculating that future quota would be based on current quota.
Dauster knew of the widespread irregularities within the IBC, of the tight and profitable connections between the IBC and the major export firms, especially those in Rio de Janeiro, and believed that a general overhaul was needed of Brazil's coffee policy.
He believed that international roasters had gained too much from long term supply contracts, in part because there had been no effective way to penalize roasters who did not meet their purchase commitments, and felt that domestic policy had long favored exporters at the expense of producers (Dauster, personal communication).
The considerable autonomy vested in the president of the IBC gave Dauster great latitude to alter policy. Dauster promised an honest administration, indicating that he would investigate and resolve immediately any claims regarding favoritism or other irregularities. He ended long term contracts and Aviso emissions, limiting the redemption of existing aviso certificates to 5 percent of the value of purchases. He told exporters that quotas would be allocated strictly as indicated in published formula, with independent auditing. He reduced IBC staff and sold airplanes, cars, and other fixed assets to achieve operating efficiencies. Finally, he created the National Council for Coffee Policy (CNPC), formed by representatives from the major domestic coffee interests (consumers, producers, exporters, domestic roasters and soluble producers), to advise the IBC president (Bertone 1992, Bacha 1992, and Dauster, personal communication) . 34 That Dauster could achieve such change in a short time was another striking indication of the IBC's independence and its president's power. Several individuals interviewed indicated that the scandal associated with Operacao Patricia facilitated these reforms, causing a call for institutional changes and the forced departure of many higher-34 Brazil has the largest internal consumption of any country other than the United States. Its domestic roasters and the soluble coffee industry are also large and have also been the recipients of many highly ranking IBC officials. The prior shift from a military government to a democratically elected government also favored reform as it made it more difficult to control information and to suppress scandals. Dauster was also very clever. For example, while he hoped the CNPC would eventually allow balanced, private-sector participation in coffee policy formation, he understood that the CNPC's representatives had opposing interests in many areas. Including them in the same advisory body ensured no single interest group could dominate, giving Dauster greater leeway to propose and implement his own policies.
An important example was his decision to initiate an auction system for coffee quota. Dauster needed revenue to purchase the 1987 crop, which was being harvested.
The 1986 Brazil crop had been reduced by drought, leading to a sharp rise in international prices. When prices surpassed the trigger level, ICA quotas had been lifted. However, the 1987 crop was expected to be the largest in Brazilian history, international prices were declining as a result and Dauster knew that ICA quotas would soon be re-imposed.
Because Brazil's production would greatly exceed its quota, the IBC would have to purchase large amounts of coffee. The government was suffering a fiscal crisis and had no funds for this purpose. Indeed, the Minister of Finance did not want to publicly confront whether to provide additional funds for coffee stock purchase. This situation gave Dauster latitude to implement policies that would produce revenue for the IBC.
After ICA quotas were reinstated in October 1987, Dauster proposed that the newly formed CNPC choose an acceptable mechanism for allocating quota. As Dauster expected, the Council's members were unable to agree. He announced that he would use the previous system to allocate 90 percent of the quota, but would auction 10 percent on a trial basis. The exceptional prices paid for quota at the initial auctions revealed the favorable arrangements with the IBC. These are not analyzed here for lack of space.
exporters' residual rents for all to see, allowing Dauster to move gradually to auction the entire quota.
Not surprisingly, Dauster's policies turned many exporters against him. The reforms ended both the residual quota rents and the illicit income that some exporters had enjoyed through their association with the IBC. Dauster also set conditions for the reimbursement of losses claimed by exporters who had participated in Operacao Patricia; these conditions required exporters to prove their losses in ways that few were prepared to do. The exporters lobbied forcefully, but unsuccessfully for his removal, though their efforts eventually had an unexpected effect.
In mid-1989, long-standing differences between the major coffee consuming countries and the coffee producing countries and among the coffee producing countries themselves, came to a head during negotiations for the next ICA. The coffee consuming countries (principally the United States) that had long supported the agreement were no longer were willing to do so. Dauster concluded that it would be impossible to develop an acceptable new agreement. He then agreed with the consuming countries that it was more sensible to terminate the quota system immediately rather than continue until the end of the current agreement, September 30, 1989. He then reduced the export tax to 6%, greatly raising the proportion of revenues captured by producers.
In early 1990, the newly elected Brazilian president, Collor de Melo, suddenly abolished the IBC. I hypothesized that the IBC was eliminated because it was a corrupt institution whose power had been greatly diminished when ICA rents were terminated. hoping to thereby end Dauster's influence and subsequently reestablish an organization that they could control. It is difficult to know which factor was more important, but rent seeking was clearly present at the IBC's demise.
After Collor de Melo abolished the IBC, he eliminated the export tax, leaving the sector essentially free from government intervention for the first time since the early 1900s. 35 In subsequent months, coffee prices fell dramatically and remained low for five years while producing countries liquidated the large coffee stocks they had built up during the 1980s (Akiyama and Varangis, 1990) . Most producing countries were convinced that the ICA would not be revived. Nonetheless, in 1993, Brazilian diplomacy supported new initiatives among coffee exporting countries to restrict international exports through a newly formed Association of Coffee Producing Countries. The agreement was unable to significantly reduce global exports, but pressures for government intervention continued.
35 Elimination of the ICA quota and the adoption of a laissez faire policy led to a significant increase in coffee sector efficiency. However, several important services that were provided by the IBC have not been taken up by other agencies since, e.g., coffee sector data collection, analysis, and publication, agronomic research and extension, and coffee policy analysis, particularly as it regards infrastructure development in Several important frosts occurred in Brazil in 1994 and coffee prices soared.
Since no quota was in effect, producer prices rose dramatically. An export tax was proposed to reduce the inflationary impact of rising coffee prices and increase government revenue, but producers successfully beat back this proposal. A number of exporters then sought to reintroduce a domestic export quota as a means to restrict international exports (and, presumably, recreate through a domestic program the quota rents that once benefited them), but the government again refused. Producers have enjoyed a much higher proportion of the world price in the last 10 years than before, and exporters have been unable to recreate the IBC. Many forces now oppose it.
Nonetheless, efforts to implement a new international coffee agreement were being discussed in Brazil in 2003.
Rent seeking and dynamic industry efficiency losses
Rent seeking raised firm costs and reduced marketing efficiency. The ICA quota and the IBC policies that it engendered provided a relatively small set of domestic exporters with substantial residual rents, but simultaneously reduced their incentives to develop efficient trading capabilities. For example, the IBC restricted the number of exporting firms that could receive quota, thereby reducing competition, until 1987. 36 The results were predictable. Those firms grew in size, but devoted their personnel increasingly to public relations and lobbying, which was often of greater value than marketing or trading expertise. Multinational firms had been among the largest exporters of Brazilian coffee prior to creation of the ICA, but played a diminished role in the 1980s.
This reduced competition and, equally important, reduced the number of Brazilians
Brazil and analysis of world markets. 36 This is similar to activities observed in Indonesia where the government effectively restricted the number trained in trading skills. Multinational firms had competitive advantages in coffee trading based on economies of scope from other commodity trading activities, economies of scale related to access to capital, and often possessed more sophisticated trading skills.
Tying quota allocation to the number of bags stocked also caused firms to increase stocks, thereby increasing real exporting costs. Similarly, imposition of the Minimum Registration Price required firms to make more involved calculations to determine what they could pay producers for coffee and to engage in black market transactions to deliver foreign exchange. IBC policy instruments changed frequently on an ad hoc basis, also causing firms to suffer higher costs from uncertainty.
When export quotas were lifted and free entry to exporting reoccurred, export firms quickly increased their efficiency. Some firms exited; new firms entered and some firms specialized in providing specific services rather than a full service business.
Greater emphasis was placed on achieving domestic value added, e.g., improved service, recognition of coffee quality differentials, and sorting. The total marketing margin decreased significantly, resulting in relatively higher prices for producers and an improved comparative advantage in coffee for Brazil. Thus, an end to rents and rent seeking promoted dynamic efficiencies in the export sector. In general, traders located outside Rio also exhibited more sophisticated knowledge of commodity trading, they were more likely to be vertically integrated, and a number were attempting to develop specialty markets for higher quality coffee.
Summary, Conclusions and Policy Lessons
The ICA was signed in 1963. Coffee export quotas were imposed in Brazil, as in other member exporting countries. Quotas created domestic rents. This study shows that rents motivated rent-seeking activity in Brazil, causing economic waste and the transfer of resources to foreign importers.
Rents were quickly perceived and sought after, and some actors were systematically more successful than others at capturing them. Public choice theory suggests that those actors who have the greatest potential for gain, who are relatively few in number and can best organize face the greatest incentives and the smallest transactions costs, respectively. They thus should have the highest probability of capturing the rents.
As theory would predict, domestic exporters got a large part of the rents, working with and through government bureaucrats and politicians. Somewhat surprisingly, foreign roasters (importers) received an even higher share of the rents.
The IBC negotiated secret, discriminatory contracts that provided large foreign roasters with export tax rebates if they agreed to purchase a prearranged amount of coffee, spaced equally throughout the year. Although the rebates were publicly explained as an efficient way to increase Brazilian sales through price discrimination, the amount paid out in rebates soon exceeded any reasonable amount. Rebates were continued during periods when ICA quotas were lifted, and then given to all importers willing to sign a long-term contract that was largely unenforceable. The growth, mutation, and longevity of the export rebates seem best explained by rent seeking, but the result is startling, given Brazil's professed concern to manipulate the international coffee sector for its own, national gain. The persistence of long-term contracts and their associated export rebates was related to the closed nature of the political process during most of this period, which limited public knowledge and debate.
Farmers' notably lesser (but not completely absent) participation in rent-seeking activities is consistent with public choice theory. Farmers were numerous and had small individual interests in rents. They were also poorly organized, had little direct contact with international markets, and thus did not easily discover the profits available through quota capture. Indeed, the ICA quota systematically lowered the domestic producer price of coffee and harmed farmers in most coffee producing countries . Brazil was no exception. The quota required Brazil to reduce its exports, which was achieved by moving Brazilian farmers down their supply curve.
Public choice theory suggests that farmers should have opposed Brazilian participation in the ICA, but Bohman and Jarvis (1998) found little evidence of farmer opposition. Moreover, when farmers, or at least a subset of their members, became aware of the rents in 1982, they sought to participate in such rents by gaining access to the quota rather abolish the source of economic harm to producers in general. I suggest that farmers supported the ICA quota because they did not understand how coffee policies influenced their welfare. Farmers were accustomed to an export tax, which they knew reduced the producer price, but they did not see the relationship between the quota and the producer price. This example suggests that public choice theory will not explain behavior when the affected parties are unable to perceive how policies affect them. The more complex is the policy context, the more difficult it will be for actors to understand policy effects.
Throughout much of this century, the government taxed coffee to fund the state and the development of infrastructure and industry. Indeed, the IBC was established so that Brazil could achieve greater benefit from the coffee sector. Nonetheless, following negotiation of the ICA quota, for more than 20 years, the IBC provided less and less revenue to the state and instead provided growing benefits to domestic and foreign rent seekers alike. Though the IBC's surprising independence, power and lack of accountability to the broader state apparatus may reflect a general deterioration of Brazil's political economy in this period, I conclude that the ICA quota, via the domestic rents that it created, contributed importantly to the IBC's poor performance.
Dauster's goal was to create a properly run IBC. He believed the IBC could make a positive contribution to the coffee sector and Brazil. His reforms succeeded in the sense that a more efficient, honest administration allowed the government to capture quota rents and eliminate the immediate costs of rent-seeking activity. Thus, the Brazilian case indicates that even when large rents exist, proper administration and choice of policy instruments can greatly reduce the harmful effects of rent-seeking activity. Nonetheless, rent seeking dies hard. So long as rents are potentially available, they constitute a powerful incentive for continued rent-seeking activity. 
